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The recent large and rapid slowdown in economic activity 
has resulted in even larger and more rapid declines in 
international trade. As world trade is set to rebound, this 
paper addresses three questions: (i) Will trade volumes 
rebound in a symmetric fashion as world economic 
growth rebounds? (ii) Will the crisis result in a change 
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1. Introduction 
Global value chains (GVCs), which only recently entered into the purview of economists, are 
now viewed as at the center of debate over causes and consequences of the 2009 collapse of 
global trade.  Feenstra (1998) noted the prominence of a global “disintegration” of production, 
but not until Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2006) essay was there broad acknowledgment by 
economists of the extraordinary nature of trade within GVCs – what the authors call “trade in 
tasks” rather than traditional trade in final goods.  Before this, trade in intermediates was 
generally modeled as a refinement of the international division of labor according to principles of 
comparative advantage (e.g. Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Since the global downturn, GVCs 
are seen as central to the dramatic collapse of world trade.
1  Well documented, this collapse has 
been more severe, rapid and persistent than trade collapses experienced in the past, including 
during the Great Depression.  This paper explores the role of GVCs in the trade collapse and the 
prospects for world trade and its geographic distribution in light of the dynamics of GVCs. 
Trade decline has potentially devastating effects on export-oriented developing countries.  As 
shown in Figure 1 (left-hand panel), the decline in US goods imports in the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the first two quarters of 2009 was greater than the decline in US GDP and the drop in 
the ratio of imports to GDP over that period represented by far the greatest three-quarter decline 
in imports both absolutely and relative to GDP since 1980 at least.  The EU has undergone a 
similar, if less dramatic, import decline (see Figure 1, right-hand panel). A similar pattern has 
been observed on a global scale as well. In an ominous sign, the drop in trade in the recent crisis 
has been found to be even more rapid than the decline in world trade at the beginning of the Great 
Depression in1929.
2  































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own illustration. Data US: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, 
Gross Domestic Product, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. Gray bars correspond to US business cycles recessions 
according to the definition of the NBER. Data EU27: Eurostat, National Accounts, seasonally adjusted and adjusted 
data by working days. Imports refer to extra-EU27 countries. 
Leading up to the recent economic downturn, developed-country imports of goods and 
services were growing faster than output, as seen in the case of the US and the EU in Figure 1.    
                                                 
1 See the array of contributions in Baldwin (2009). 
2 Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009). 3 
 
This was due to a variety of factors, including the liberalization of trade and capital flows and the 
decline in the cost of international transportation and especially communications.  Business 
strategies have also become increasingly international, and today a significant amount of world 
trade occurs within global value chains, that is, international systems of production typically 
governed by lead firms who coordinate sometimes elaborate networks of suppliers.
3 As a result 
of these factors, changes in the value and volume of trade over the business cycle are greater 
today than they were in the 1960s.  
In this paper we address three questions:   
(i) Will trade volumes rebound in a symmetric fashion as world economic growth rebounds? 
(ii) Will the crisis result in a change in the structure of trade, in particular will it lead to a 
reversal of the pattern of more diversified sourcing and thus to a consolidation of global value 
chains? 
(iii) What policies can improve the prospects for developing country growth in the event that 
trade volumes do not rebound symmetrically and there is a consolidation of some global value 
chains?   
Previous research shows that on average over business cycles since 1975 the effect on 
international trade is (a) larger than the effect on GDP and (b) symmetric, like the movement of 
GDP.  The 2010 International Trade Statistics released by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
suggest a similar pattern for the recent crisis: after the sharpest decline in more than 70 years, 
world trade is set to rebound in 2010 by growing at 9.5%, assuming a 2.9% global GDP growth.
4 
However, the recent downturn has been deeper and different from previous downturns, so there is 
a greater likelihood of a lag in the recovery of the volume of world trade.  It has involved a credit 
crunch, and thus a collapse of trade credit.  The crisis might also have brought a structural change 
in aggregate demand as US consumption, for example, may settle at a lower rate relative to 
income, and as the Chinese yuan is revalued relative to the dollar, further shifting the world 
pattern of trade. We therefore suggest that those factors will affect the pace and pattern of trade 
recovery. 
Regarding the second question, we undertake an empirical analysis of the change in the 
concentration of trade flows, using a Hirschman-Herfindahl index that measures concentration in 
terms of trade flows by country rather than in terms of market share by firms.  We find that 
consolidation has been more likely in “buyer-led” global value chains and greater dispersion in 
“producer-led” global value chains. Regarding the third question, we briefly discuss the prospects 
for developing country fiscal stimulus and for South-South trade expansion.  Our preliminary 
analysis shows that there is promising growth potential for South-South trade based on the 
experience of the past 20 years, but that this growth too may be limited if global value chains are 
consolidated, since the largest category of South-South trade is in intermediates. 
This paper has six sections. In Section 2 we briefly assess the degree of developing country 
export success over the past 20 years in both goods and services.  This success has created a 
greater reliance on export revenue in aggregate demand.  In Section 3 we look in more detail at 
the role of GVCs in the decline in US and EU import demand between 2008 and the third quarter 
of 2009, including estimates of the US income elasticity of import demand during the crisis 
compared to long-run elasticities, and a discussion of the possibility of a shifting V-curve of 
import demand. In Section 4 we look more closely at the sectoral and developing country impact 
of the import decline in the US and EU. In Section 5 we propose a theory of vertical and 
horizontal global value chain (GVC) consolidation. We then present data on changes in the 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of global value chains, see Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi et al. (2005).  
4 WTO, Press Release of March 26, 2010. 4 
 
geographic concentration of global exports in detailed product areas.  Section 6 begins with a 
brief discussion of prospects for expanding South-South trade as a substitute for declines in 
North-South trade that may be long-term both because of the changing structure of world demand 
and the consolidation of some global value chains. 
We end with some policy conclusions, which are necessarily tentative since the recovery is 
unfolding as we conduct our research. These conclusions focus on the need for a continued 
support of trade credit by the international financial corporations, the need for developing 
countries to find other, non-export, sources of demand, or to diversify trade patterns to focus 
more on trade among developing countries, and the need for developed countries to resist trade 
protection measures even in a time of high and persistent rates of unemployment. 
2. GVCs and the Export Reliance of Developing Countries 
The expansion of global value chains began in the 1980s as developing countries shifted from 
import substitution strategies to export-oriented development strategies.  Developing countries’ 
dramatic export success is evident in Figure 2 (left-hand panel), which shows that since the early 
1980s the export share of low and middle-income countries in world exports of goods and 
services rose almost steadily over the past 20 years.  The goods export share rose from 16% in 
1986 to over 30% in 2008, while the services export share grew from 13% to 20% in 2007. This 
shift in world trade patterns also means that developing countries are much more reliant on export 
revenues for final demand. On average, low- and medium-income countries became steadily 
more export oriented, with exports as a share of GDP growing to 33% in 2007 compared to just 
15% in 1980.  China’s enormous success is well known, and its export reliance went from around 
3% of GDP in 1970 to almost 43% in 2007.  But the increased export orientation was also 
dramatic in Mexico, South Korea, Argentina and India, among others (Figure 2, right-hand 
panel). See Appendix 1 for the export shares by region of origin. 























































































































































































































LMIC ARG BRA CHN IND KOR MEX RUS ZAF
Exports (% of  National GDP), Selected Countries
1970 1990 2007
Source: Own illustration. Data: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
NB: Low & middle income countries cover most developing countries. 
The increased export orientation of developing economies also involved a change in the 
structure of international trade due to the expansion of global production networks, also called 
global value chains. With the expansion of global value chains in the 1980s, trade in inputs grew 
dramatically as a share of total input use. Figure 3 shows that by 2004, low- and middle-income 5 
 
countries accounted for 35% of world exports of intermediate goods, with a rapid acceleration in 
this share in the 2000s. The growth of capital goods and consumption goods exports has 
remained relatively stable since the late 1980s. Milberg and Winkler (2010a) report that the share 
of US imported inputs of materials and services in total non-energy input use grew at an average 
rate of 2% and 1.7%, respectively, per annum between 1998 and 2006, reaching levels of over 
25% in some sectors, including apparel and motor vehicles by 2006.  
Figure 3: Goods Exports from Low and Middle Income Countries by Product Category (% of 








































































































































































Source: Own calculations. Data: UN Comtrade.  
NB: See Appendix 2 for the definition of the different product categories. 
These figures of offshoring measure trade in inputs and thus may understate the magnitude of 
trade within global supply chains. Global corporations in the major industrialized countries are 
not strictly involved in assembly. Much of the import activity in global supply chains is in fully 
finished goods. In fact, the purpose of corporate offshoring, whether at arm’s-length or through 
foreign subsidiaries, is precisely to allow the corporation to focus on its “core competence”, 
while leaving other aspects of the process, often including production, to others. Many 
“manufacturing” firms now do not manufacture anything at all. They provide product and brand 
design, marketing, supply chain logistics and financial management services.  
Thus an alternative proxy for offshoring may simply be imports from developing countries. 
We see in Table 1 that Japan and the U.S. now rely heavily on goods imports from low-income 
developing countries (29% and 23% respectively), which we define as the narrow measure of 
goods offshoring. While the European countries are at much lower levels, all countries have seen 
more than a doubling of the narrow measure of goods offshoring since 1991 (see CAGR). 
However, offshore destinations also include developing countries with a higher income level, 
such as Mexico, Brazil or South Africa. Thus the broad measure of goods offshoring, including 
imports from all developing countries, shows that developing country imports constitute over half 
of total imports by Japan (68%) and the U.S. (54%), while the European countries range from 
23% in the U.K to only 13% in Denmark.
5 
Since services import data by regions of origin are not available for our relevant time period, 
we define a country’s import share of ‘computer and information services’ plus ‘other business 
                                                 
5 The relevant economic groupings of developing countries according to the UNCTAD can be found here: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/stats/docs//gds_csirb_c&td-2-9_en.pdf 6 
 
services’ in total services imports as narrow measure of services offshoring. The broad measure 
of services offshoring additionally takes ‘communication services’ and ‘financial services’ into 
account. In Table 1 we see that Japan and Denmark saw a small decline in services offshoring 
between 1991 and 2006, while the other countries experienced compound annual growth rates of 
services offshoring of between 1.3% and 5.2%. 
Table 1: Goods and Services Offshoring Intensities, Selected Countries, 1991 vs. 2006 





1991 2.9% 3.8% 4.1% 14.9% 3.0% 8.6%
2006 6.5% 6.3% 8.2% 29.1% 8.2% 23.1%
CAGR 5.4% 3.4% 4.7% 4.5% 7.0% 6.8%
1991 9.0% 15.2% 14.6% 49.3% 14.1% 40.1%
2006 13.1% 16.4% 17.0% 68.2% 22.8% 54.1%
CAGR 2.5% 0.5% 1.0% 2.2% 3.3% 2.0%
1991 23.1% 13.0% 20.0% 29.2% 13.7% 10.4%
2006 20.0% 28.0% 26.1% 24.3% 22.6% 18.6%
CAGR -1.0% 5.2% 1.8% -1.2% 3.4% 4.0%
1991 23.1% 24.7% 22.1% 31.6% 17.7% 18.6%
2006 22.3% 33.4% 31.6% 27.0% 32.9% 22.6%
CAGR -0.2% 2.0% 2.4% -1.0% 4.2% 1.3%
Services Offshoring Intensity 
(Broad Measure)
Goods Offshoring Intensity 
(Narrow Measure)
Goods Offshoring Intensity 
(Broad Measure)
Services Offshoring Intensity 
(Narrow Measure)
 
Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010b). Data: OECD National Accounts database, UNCTAD GlobStat Database.  
Economic development has become increasingly associated with “economic upgrading” or 
“industrial upgrading” within GVCs, requiring that firms move up through the chain of 
production of a particular commodity into higher value added activities. This involves raising 
productivity and skills through training, mechanization and the introduction of new technologies. 
It also requires fitting into existing corporate strategies by linking closely to lead firms. In 
manufacturing, such upgrading has been associated also with qualitative change, with firms 
moving from parts production or assembly, to design and more integrated production, to fully-
integrated production to original brand design. Humphries and Schmidt (2004) describe four 
types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and chain.  Product and 
process involve productivity gains while the producer remains largely in the same place in the 
global value chain.  Functional upgrading involves moving into more technologically 
sophisticated and higher value added aspects of an existing chain.  And chain upgrading implies 
moving into a new, related value chain that also involves more skills, capital and value added. 
The economic theory of vertical integration focuses on transactions cost minimizing behavior 
by lead firms and distinguishes hierarchical from market-based relations within GVCs.
6  Gereffi 
(1994) shifts the focus of analysis of GVCs, characterizing global value chains as “buyer-led” or 
“producer-led” depending on the nature of the lead firm. Large retailers (e.g. Wal-Mart, Sears, JC 
Penney and K-Mart) and firms with global brands (e.g. Nike, Liz Claiborne) lead buyer-led 
global value chains and are more likely to work at arm’s-length with suppliers and to have 
supplier contracts of shorter duration.  Manufacturers in more high-tech areas such as automobile, 
aircraft and aspects of electronics (e.g. Ford, Boeing, Apple) lead producer-led chains in which 
                                                 
6 Williamson (2000) and more recently Grossman and Helpman (2005).  For an extension, see Gereffi et al. (2005). 7 
 
ownership of suppliers (through foreign direct investment) is more likely, and in which supplier 
contracts are of longer duration. 
3.  The Role of GVCs in the Collapse of World Trade, 2007-2009 
3.1 Cyclicality and the “Composition Effect” 
Why did trade volumes collapse so dramatically relative to GDP in the recent downturn? Freund 
(2009) shows that historically trade flows are pro-cyclical and follow a more exaggerated cyclical 
pattern than GDP. She analyzes the effect on the value of international trade of global economic 
downturns in 1975, 1982, 1991 and 2001, and finds that global economic downturns in the recent 
past have, on average, been associated with declines in the volume of world trade proportionally 
greater than the change in GDP.  On average over these downturns, GDP growth fell to 1.5% and 
the growth in trade value turned negative, to -1.0%. In the year leading to the trough of the cycle, 
she finds the percentage point fall in trade is five times that of world output.  By this standard, if 
world GDP in the recent recession falls by 4.8 percentage points, then world trade will fall by 
over 20 percentage points. Importantly, Freund (2009) also predicts that the GDP-trade relation is 
symmetric, i.e. that the rebound in trade is greater than the rebound in GDP and that the recovery 
of trade is as fast as was the decline in trade. Most of the trade rebound occurs the same year as 
the GDP growth increase, but “it takes about 4 years for trade to pass pre-downturn levels” 
(Freund, 2009, p. 8). According to the WTO, the 2010 trade rebound should help recover some, 
but not all, of the 2009 trade losses that occurred when the global crisis prompted a 12.2% 
contraction in the volume of global trade; the WTO forecasts that, should trade continue to 
expand at its current pace, it would take at least two years in developing countries, and three 
years in developed countries, for trade volume to surpass the peak level of 2008.
7 
One reason trade reacts more strongly to changes in GDP during a recession than otherwise is 
the difference in the composition of trade and GDP.  In a global downturn the demand for goods 
falls more strongly than the demand for services, because goods represent the bulk of trade flows, 
while services make up the bulk of GDP. In particular, the demand for “postponeable” goods – 
consumer durables, and investment goods related intermediates, which make up a narrow slice of 
world GDP, but a large percentage of world trade – dropped sharply during the crisis. Thus the 
global crisis operated with full force on trade, but with less force on GDP as a whole.
8  
Evidence of the composition effect is confirmed in Figure 4, showing the sharp decline in 
“industrial supplies and materials” in the figure (-49% YTY in August 2009).  The decline in 
consumer goods imports (-17% YTY in August 2009) is much less and the decline in the growth 
of services imports (-15% YTY in August 2009) even less than for goods. Throughout the 
downturn, services trade, especially of business services, has been relatively unaffected (see 
Borchert and Mattoo, 2009). Borchert and Mattoo (2009) list a number of reasons why the 
demand for services has contracted less than the demand for goods in the recent crisis, including 
the non-storability of services and the fact that a larger part of services demand involves 
outsourced services (e.g. book-keeping) which are “necessities” for producers.  
 
                                                 
7 WTO (2010). 
8 Baldwin (2009). 8 
 





















































































































Source: Own illustration. Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Accounts Products, quarterly imports of 
goods, balance of payments-based data, seasonally adjusted. 
 
3.2 Globalization in the Long-Run versus “Crisis Elasticities” of Trade 
A second explanation of the collapse in world trade in the most recent downturn is that economic 
globalization has, over decades, resulted in a steady increase in the income elasticity of world 
trade, so that the relatively large GDP decline in recent years has been matched by a historic 
decline in the volume of world trade. Freund (2009) reports estimates showing a monotonic 
increase in the income elasticity of world trade over successive decades since the 1960s, rising 
from 1.94 in the 1960s to 3.69 in the 2000s.  As a result, for an identical percentage drop in GDP 
now leads to a greater percentage decline in trade than previously. Thus, a 1 percent reduction in 
real income lowered real trade by around 2 percent in the 1960s, which has increased gradually to 
3.7 in recent years.  










.                                                                                                              (1) 
Using quarterly GDP and import data, we approximated the US income elasticities of import 











,                                                                                                                            (2) 
where subscript t denotes the quarter,  4 tt t M MM    , and  4 tt t YYY    . Figure 5 (left-hand 
panel) confirms the increase in the income elasticity of imports for the US over the last four 
decades. We did not show the data for 2008:Q4-2009:Q4, as the drop and subsequent increase 
were extremely high. 
Note that greater economic openness per se – the result of trade liberalization or technological 
change or changing business strategies – does not imply a higher income elasticity of import 
demand.  To the contrary, it other things equal, a higher import propensity, M/Y, lowers the 9 
 
income elasticity of import demand as evident in equation (1).
9  However, if the increase in the 
import propensity is matched by a larger increase in the incremental import-GDP ratio,  / M Y   , 
then the elasticity will indeed rise. Figure 5 (right-hand panel) below shows that the US 
incremental import-GDP ratio was higher (in absolute value terms) in the last two business cycles 
than previously and that during the recent downturn the incremental import-GDP ratio was larger 
(again in absolute value) in the past two years than ever since 1970. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations. Data US: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, 
Gross Domestic Product, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. NB: Gray bars correspond to US business cycles 
recessions according to the definition of the NBER.  
An important issue is whether the recent downturn has resulted in a structural break in 
historical elasticity patterns.  To judge whether that history is a useful guide in the current 
context, we estimated long-run income elasticities of import demand in the US for 16 countries 
and compared these to the current experience.  We refer to the latter as “crisis elasticities”.  The 
long-term elasticities for goods and services separately were estimated using bilateral, quarterly 
trade data for the period 1999 to 2008.  We apply an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
approach to co-integration, which yields consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients 
regardless whether the regressors are I(1) or I(0) and thus  does not require pre-testing for unit 
root (Pesaran et al., 2001). The ARDL approach adds short-run dynamics to a long-run 
estimation equation as given in (3): 
11 1 2 1 3 1
111
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
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jj j j j
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(3) 
where M designates real import demand for imports from country j, Y real domestic income, and 
E real bilateral exchange rate between the US and country j at time t. E is defined as the amount 
of units of foreign currency per US Dollar and εt denotes the random error term.  The lagged level 
variables constitute the so-called lagged error-correction term, which should be retained or 
excluded from the equation based on the F-statistics.  Appendices 5 and 6 give full details of the 
estimation procedures, sample and the estimation results.  The long-run relations are given by the 
estimates of ν3 in Table A2 (column 4). Only six countries show significant results, while others 
miss the 10%-level narrowly. The highest elasticities are for China and India. They imply that a 
                                                 
9 In fact, there is some debate over Freund’s elasticity estimates.  Escaith et al. (2010) find that trade elasticities rose 
in the 1990s compared to the previous decade, but then were lower in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. 10 
 
1% US income increase is expected to raise goods imports demand for China and India by 8.6 
and 8.1%, respectively. Germany and Brazil show elasticities of 1.9 and 1.2. Interestingly, four 
Asian and two Latin American countries show negative elasticities, which is significant however 
only for Hong Kong, China.  
Regarding services imports, the estimates become more significant. The F-tests show that only 
India, UK, and Venezuela should not include the error-correction term when calculating short-run 
effects. The long-run elasticities are nearly all positive and significant in 13 countries. Canada, 
China, France, Hong Kong, and Germany show the largest service import elasticities which range 
7.6 and 4.7 %. Given the high absolute value of services imports from India, an elasticity of 2.1% 
still seems to be very high. 
Table 2 shows the long-run income elasticities of US import demand for goods (column 1) and 
the “crisis elasticities” which are derived from data for the last half of 2008 for the major trading 
partners of the United States (column 3).  In many cases the long-run estimate is many times less 
than what has been experience in the crisis period. For Brazil, for example, the long-run elasticity 
of 1.24 jumps to 11.6 in the crisis period.  For Taiwan (China) it jumps from 0.77 to 7.6  and for 
South Africa from 1.21 to 28.9. For Mexico, the estimate is statistically insignificantly different 
from zero in the long-run estimate, jumping to 10.6 in the crisis.  In the cases of India and China 
the long-run elasticities are not so different from the crisis period, falling slightly in both cases 
but from already extremely high long-run values.  Our findings supports the results of Levchenko 
et al. (2009) who find an enormous gap (“wedge”) between predicted US imports based on 
historical data and the actual drop in US import demand. 






   Q1:1999-Q4:2008  Q3:2008-Q4:2008 
Country  Goods   Services  Goods  Services 
Argentina  n.s.  2.25  -0.9  -4.6 
Brazil  1.24  -0.60  11.6  1.0 
Canada  n.s.  7.56  16.3  22.7 
China  8.65  6.02  5.5  1.0 
France  n.s.  5.41  2.3  10.8 
Germany  1.86  4.70  5.4  5.9 
Hong Kong  -2.75  5.50  13.3  -2.0 
India  8.06  2.07  6.0  -3.2 
Japan  n.s.  1.74  5.0  0.8 
Korea, Rep. of  n.s.  0.68  6.7  13.1 
Mexico  n.s.  0.79  10.6  2.4 
Singapore  n.s.  1.92  7.6  7.0 
South Africa  1.21  0.69  28.9  8.6 
Taiwan  0.77  2.34  7.6  0.4 
United Kingdom  n.s.  n.s.  13.1  7.4 
Venezuela  n.s.  n.s.  61.3  0.1 
Source: Own calculations. Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis. NB: n.s. = not significant. Income elasticities 
Q3:2008-Q4:2008 are calculated  based on equation (2), where  1 tt t M MM    , and  1 tt t YYY   . 
 11 
 
Evidence on services trade is quite different.  While there is only one sector with a negative 
income elasticity in the long-run analysis, three countries have a negative relation in the crisis 
period, and three other countries have values lower than one (that is, very low).  Argentina, India 
and Hong Kong have negative elasticities in the crisis period, reflecting that US services imports 
of some types have increased, even as national income has fallen. Business processing services 
are part of fixed rather than variable costs and thus are likely to rise, especially when profits are 
squeezed, while expenditures on variable inputs (imported and domestic) fall with the decline in 
final goods and services orders. 
3.3 GVCs: Flexibility and Synchronicity 
There is no doubt that the globalization of production has raised the ratio of global imports and 
exports per unit of output over time. Freund (2009, p. 6), for example, writes that “an increase in 
GDP may lead to more outsourcing and much more measured trade, as an increasing number of 
parts travel around the globe to be assembled, and again to their final consumer.”  Greater 
vertical specialization in production means that the import content of exports has also risen.
10 
With vertical specialization, a decline in final demand reduces trade in both final and 
intermediate goods and services. In a study of the US, Ferrantino and Larsen (2009, p. 177) note 
the connection between imports and exports:  “[T]he drop in US imports for computers and cell 
phones leads indirectly to a drop in US exports of semiconductors and components.” In a study of 
the recent export decline in Japan, Fukao and Yuan (2009) find that adding to the decline in US 
demand for Japanese final goods is the decline in demand for intermediate goods aimed for 
assembly in East Asia for shipment to the US.
11 The point is that such fragmentation contributes 
both to a rising trade propensity and to a rising incremental import-GDP ratio. 
Lead firms with declining profits will seek drastic means to cut costs and thus may substitute 
cheaper foreign inputs for domestic inputs. This is the “substitution effect” having a positive 
effect on trade flows of intermediates.  There are reports, for example, that with the burst of the 
dot.com bubble in 2001, IT firms faced a profit squeeze and turned increasingly to offshore 
sourcing for both hardware and software.
12 Scott (2009) notes that an important part of US auto 
companies’ adjustment to their current unprofitable position is likely to be a significant increase 
in offshoring, especially from Mexico. Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck (2010, p. 42) identify the 
likelihood of such a substitution affect by lead firms in the automobile sector in the US and 
Western Europe (sourcing in Mexico and East and Central Europe, respectively) if market shares 
continue to decline. 
                                                 
10 Yi  (2009). 
11 Note that this does not mean there is more value added in international trade, but simply that there is more trade 
per unit of output and a likelihood of a greater change in the volume of trade for a given change in real output. There 
is some double counting of value added in GVC-based trade, as the value of imported inputs is included in the value 
of exports.  The greater import content of exports (vertical specialization) accounts for a significant amount of the 
measured growth in world trade. Chen et al. (2005) find that double counting of value in trade figures occurs more in 
manufacturers than in services.  For the US in 2000, adjusted exports would be $198 billion (or 9 percentage points 
less) than reported in 2000 trade figures.  Koopman et al. (2008) calculate value added in Chinese exports in 2002 to 
be about 51% of total export value. Lindet et al. (2007) show that Chinese value added in its export of the $143 
Apple 30GB video ipod (reatil price of $299) was $5.  
12 Reported in Friedman (2005). Scott (2009) notes that an important part of US auto companies’ adjustment to their 
current unprofitable position is likely to be a significant increase in offshoring, especially from Mexico.  Sturgeon 
and van Biesebroeck (2010, p. 42) identify the likelihood of such a substitution affect by lead firms in the automobile 
sector in the US and Western Europe (sourcing in Mexico and East and Central Europe, respectively) if market 
shares continue to decline. 12 
 
 This substitution effect is further influenced by the heightened uncertainty of future demand 
after the crisis, which may encourage firms to externalize further their sourcing in order to 
increase their flexibility in response to future demand stagnation or volatility. Nonetheless, the 
large declines in the volume of trade seen in the recent crisis indicate clearly that the demand 
effect has so far swamped the substitution effect. 
The rise in trade elasticities, then, is due not to a rise in trade openness but to the rising 
sensitivity of trade to changes in GDP, that is, to the nature of GVCs, not to the globalization of 
production per se.  There are at least two reasons why the expansion of global value chains has 
increased trade openness and raised incremental import-GDP ratios. The rise in the incremental 
import-GDP ratio is the result of the magnitude and speed with which adjustments that take place 
when supply chains are well-coordinated by lead firms.  An important reason for lead firms to 
establish global production networks in the first place is the flexibility they provide.  GVCs allow 
adjustment to changes in market demand to occur quickly and for the risk of demand declines and 
inventory adjustment to be borne to a greater extent by supplier firms. Innovations in lean 
retailing, fast fashion and just-in-time inventory management control, and full-package 
outsourcing, have all been built on GVC governance strategies.  Suppliers too have developed in 
a way that seeks to manage the environment of flexibility-seeking lead firms.  Modular 
production processes give supplier firms capacity to serve different product lines and even 
different GVCs.
13  Adding to the speed of adjustment in trade in a downturn is that firms might 
make use of accumulated inventories first.
14 
In a world of disintegrated production and lean retailing, the GDP downturn like that 
experienced in 2008-2009 resulted not only to larger declines in trade than previously but also at 
a more rapid rate. Recent research confirms that the trade collapse was “synchronized” across 
countries, which Baldwin (2009b) also attributes to the internationalization of the supply chain. 
Global value chains are a channel for the rapid transmission of both real and financial shocks. 
Shifts in demand for final goods can immediately affect flows of intermediates, especially when 
supplier contracts are short-term. Credit market problems, which can have a negative 
international “cascade effect” through global value chains, as the denial of credit to importers in 
one country can lead to credit problems for sellers in others, reducing their access to credit, 
affecting in turn their ability to import.
15  
3.4 Trade Credit Crunch 
There are strong indications of an additional factor at work today that has driven down 
international trade activity: the freezing up of lines of credit for undertaking international trade 
transactions, also known as trade finance. A survey of multinational buyers (i.e. lead-firms and 
higher-tier supplier firms in global value chains) indicates that the drop in orders may be more a 
function of “new credit bottlenecks” than declining final demand per se.
16 Trade finance 
comprises a number of financial instruments, including letters of credit, pre-export financing, 
factoring and forfeiting, advance payment guarantees, export credit insurance and export credit 
guarantees.
17 The slowdown in trade credit provision has come as a result of  more stringent bank 
credit  and capital allocation criteria,  growing distrust between international banking 
counterparts who must cooperate in the provision of trade credit, more stringent requirements on 
                                                 
13 Sturgeon (2004). 
14 Freund (2009), Baldwin (2009b). 
15 Escaith and Gonguet (2009). 
16 Auboin (2009). See ICC (2009) for a survey measuring the decline in the volume of trade credit. 
17 Drawn from Chauffour and Farole (2009), Appendix 1. 13 
 
borrowers’ invoice and payment systems, and a drying up of the secondary market for trade 
financing instruments. 
A trade credit crunch will put a more severe damper on the volume of international trade when 
such trade is organized in global value chains.  There are two reasons for this.  For one, a 
bottleneck due to lack of credit in one part of the chain can reduce trade for the entire chain. As 
described by ICC (2009, p. 4): “Supply chains have produced undesirable side effects. Exporters 
in international supply chains are better shielded from financial turmoil because they have access 
to credit from buyers.  However, with their own access to finance drying up, global buyers will 
become more restrictive in providing finance along their supply chains.”  
Second, global value chains are potentially a channel for the rapid transmission of financial 
shocks, in particular through credit markets, which can have a negative international “cascade 
effect” as the denial of credit to importers in one country lead to credit problems for sellers in 
others, reducing their access to credit, affecting in turn their ability to import, etc.  This is a 
vicious cycle between the real and the financial sides of the economy.
18 The implication is that 
the decline in world trade is greater when the credit crunch occurs within a production system 
organized through global value chains.  This combination is a unique feature of the recent crisis 
and thus may account for the break from historical output-demand relations as seen in the 
elasticity estimates that we present in the next section. For this reason, the G20 provision of $250 
billion to support trade finance over the next two years is an important step in easing the financial 
side of the trade collapse.
19 
3.5 The Shifting V-Curve of Trade? 
The recent WTO prediction of a rapid trade recovery includes an acknowledgment that its 
forecasts could be either overly optimistic (if there are, for example, unexpected increases in oil 
prices, appreciation or depreciation of major currencies, or additional adverse developments in 
financial market),  or overly pessimistic (if, for instance, unemployment rates in developed 
countries were to drop faster than anticipated).
20.  As seen in Figure 1 and in more detail in the 
elasticity estimates, the decline in trade relative to GDP is greater than the historical pattern 
would predict and thus elasticities estimated on data from past cycles are not a reliable guide to 
future trends. Freund (2009) identifies a distinct V-shaped curve in the volume of world trade 
over the business cycle, and Baldwin and Taglioni (2009) use the past V-curve to predict a 
relatively rapid recovery of trade volumes to pre-crisis levels.  To date, this recovery of trade is 
not following the historical V-curve, as seen in Figure 6, which compares the historical pattern of 
the past two U.S. recessions to the recent experience.  The import decline is larger and more 
rapid, as we have noted before.  Moreover, the recovery in imports is in the form of smaller 
percentage quarterly declines.  Thus two years from the previous business cycle peak, U.S. 
imports are still falling at a 10% rate. The V-curve appears to have shifted to the right. 
                                                 
18 Escaith and Gonguet (2009), Amiti and Weinstein (2009), Mora and Powers (2009). 
19 Auboin (2009), p.6. 
20 WTO (2010). 14 
 













Source: Own illustration. Data US: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, 
Gross Domestic Product, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. 0 refers to the peak of the US business cycles 
recessions according to the definition of the NBER. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the shift in the V-curve. For one, the recent 
downturn may involve a macroeconomic restructuring in many industrial countries, as debt 
burdens are worked off, household consumption is reduced and as government spending partly 
offsets declines in consumption and business investment demand. Consumption expenditure in 
the US in particular is recovering much more slowly than in previous recoveries.
21 A second, but 
related factor is China’s development trajectory and exchange rate policy, with the renminbi 
generally considered undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.  While the renminbi appreciated vis-à-
vis the dollar until 2006, it has remained constant since.  This has been associated with expanding 
Chinese market share for many US and EU import products.  But pressures for a revaluation 
remain, and a US recovery at a higher rate of private saving, a higher rate of public dissaving and 
a weakened dollar, may bring a very different world trade picture, with lower levels of trade and 
consolidated GVCs.
22 After reviewing the experience of individual countries and sector in the 
recent period, we turn to analysis of GVC consolidation.
23 We should add that the financial 
origins of this downturn resulted in a tightening of trade credit, which may contribute to the shift 
in the V-curve. 
                                                 
21 Kaplinsky  and  Farooki (2010), and  Ferrentino and Larsen (2009) make a similar argument. 
22 See Kaplinsky and Farooki (2010). 
23 Freund (2009) in fact predicts some worsening of the US current account imbalance based on past experience. 15 
 
4.  Country and Product Profile of the Decline in US and EU Import Demand 
4.1 Product-Based Analysis of US and EU Imports 
The country level variation in import demand is a function of macroeconomic conditions (foreign 
demand growth and changes in the real effective exchange rate) and the commodity composition 
of trade. To look more closely at the latter, we explore the shifts in import demand in the US and 
EU over the past 12-18 months in more detail. Figure 4 above showed the US import trends for 
broad commodity groupings, which showed that industrial supplies and materials imports fell 
much more than consumer goods (except autos) and services. These data are aggregated up from 
the detailed goods import data presented in Appendix 3. Total goods imports decreased by 31% in 
August 2009 on a year-to-year (YTY) basis.  In our first analysis of the downturn (Milberg and 
Winkler, 2009a) for February 2009, US imports fell most in motor vehicles, oil and construction 
on a YTY basis, and with the smallest declines in food and clothing, two consumer necessities.  
The decline in motor vehicle demand in the US has had significant international repercussions, 
since the US motor vehicle production is more reliant on imported inputs than any other sector of 
the economy, with over 25% of inputs imported.
24  Our first analysis using February 2009 YTY 
data showed that rapid declines in imports of various categories of auto and truck parts by 
dramatic amounts, ranging from a decline in imports of unfinished metals (largely used for motor 
vehicles) of 55%, automotive vehicles, parts and engines (-54%), of which bodies and chassis for 
passenger cars (-71%).  These declines are the result of a combination of a sudden collapse of 
consumer demand for new automobiles and the highly developed global value chains developed 
by US and US-based firms. As discussed above, the fact that the demand drop was concentrated 
at first in consumer durables and investment goods such as construction materials 
(“postponeables” in Baldwin’s (2009b) terminology) meant that there was a much more drastic 
impact on trade than on GDP, since the latter is dominated by services.
25 See Appendix 4 for the 
detailed services import data. 
The sectoral declines in US imports give some indication of the composition of shifts in labor 
demand.  Since it is medium-technology goods whose demand has fallen most, we would expect 
low-skill manufacturing workers in developing countries to have suffered most in terms of 
employment and wages.  Services workers – both low and high skill – have so far been affected 
less because private services have continued to grow and even the most affected services sector 
(other transportation) has declined considerably less than the average decline for goods. 
The pattern of import decline for the EU is similar to that in the US, but less pronounced. EU 
goods import growth can be found in Figure 7. Total goods imports fell by almost 29% in August 
2009 on a YTY basis. Manufactured goods showed the biggest decline, reaching more than -40% 
since the second quarter of 2009. This again supports the finding that the drop of demand fell 
most strongly for “postponeables”, that is, consumer durables, and investment goods. As in the 
US, the demand for imported industrial supplies and materials (mineral fuels, lubricants, and 
related materials; animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels) showed a sharp decline, while more necessary consumer goods such as food and 
miscellaneous manufactured articles (including clothing and footwear) dropped by less.
26 
                                                 
24 See Figure 5 above.  For a detailed analysis, see Sturgeon and van Biesebroeck (2010). 
25 Borchert and Mattoo (2009) list a number of reasons why the demand for services has contracted less than the 
demand for goods in the current crisis, including the non-storability of services and the fact that a larger part of 
services demand involves outsourced services (e.g. book-keeping) which are “necessities” for producers. 
26 Unfortunately, Eurostat does not report trade data for services. 16 
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Source: Own illustration. Data: Eurostat, External Trade by SITC. 
 
4.2 Regional Analysis of Developing Country Exports 
While China’s exports to the US declined during the downturn by more than those in other 
countries (see Figure 8, left-hand panel), it is only China among the top five exporters to the US 
that have seen a significant rebound in trade volume.  This implies that China’s share of US 
imports has grown significantly, reaching 20% in September 2009, which represents the highest 
share since January 2007 besides January 2009. China has gained market share despite the 
decline in US imports.  Canada’s import share has fallen between 1 to 2 percentage points since 17 
 
the outbreak of the crisis, but the top five importers combined have gained market share from 
52.6% in August 2008 to 55.4% in September 2009. 
A similar pattern holds for the EU import market. While imports from the US have continued 
to fall through July 2009, Chinese imports were already rising for four consecutive months (see 
Figure 8, right-hand panel). Since March 2009, Chinese imports have gained market share at the 
cost of the second biggest importer, the US. China’s import share reached 17.6% in July 2009, 
while the US market share was only 12.4%. The total market share of the top five importers was 
50.9% in July 2009, compared to 48.1% in August 2008. 
















































































































































































































Source: Own illustration. Data: US International Trade Commission; Eurostat, External Trade. 
NB: Top Five Imports in August 2008. 
China’s outstanding performance in US and EU markets appears to have been matched by 
some other countries in late 2009, as seen in Figure 9 where goods export growth on a YTY basis 
are compared across all countries for which data were available. While most countries saw 
smaller declines in exports in Q3 2009 compared to Q2, a small number of countries began to see 
export increases (on a YTY basis) in November, including Indonesia, Taiwan (China), Thailand,, 
Chile, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Thailand.  Still, many countries showed considerable export 
declines in Q3 2009 of over 25% compared to a year earlier.  This confirms that even a delayed 
recovery in world trade is likely to take place at very different rates across countries, again, 
depending on country specialization patterns and trends in GVC consolidation.  
 18 
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Source: Own illustration. Data: EIU Country Data. 19 
 
5. Consolidation of GVCs: Theory and Evidence 
Through the 1980s and 1990s more and more countries entered into global export markets, 
typically producing intermediate inputs or performing assembly in global value chains.  Different 
GVCs expanded at different rates, with apparel and automobiles expanding in the 1960s and 
1970s in terms of the dispersion and complexity of the supply chain, and with the services sector 
and business services of other sectors being among the more recent parts of growing and 
expanding GVCs.  But with the onset of the crisis, there is broader evidence of consolidation of 
some types of supply chains. 
5.1 Historical Trends in GVC Structure 
Our measure of GVC structure is a modified version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
calculated for each product category by taking the total sum of the squared market shares of all 
countries exporting that product and multiplying the sum by 10,000: 
2 ( ) 10,000, ji j
i
HHI S      
where  ij S  is the share of country i expressed as a percentage of total world exports of product j.
27 
The HHI can range between 1/n*10,000, i.e. all countries have the same share, and 10,000, i.e. 
one country exports all, where n designates the total number of countries exporting this product. 
A decline reflects a decrease in “concentration” or, more accurately, a greater degree of spatial 
dispersion of export sourcing in that sector. The US Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice considers HHIs between 1,000 and 1,800 points to be moderately concentrated, and those 
exceeding 1,800 points to be concentrated.
28 Although this rule of thumb refers to the original 
HHI, i.e. to firms’ market shares in a particular market rather than to the market shares of 
exporting countries, it provides a convenient benchmark. 
Figure 10 shows the graph of the index of industrial concentration for a selection of three-digit 
sectors for selected years from 1970-2008.  Note that recent data should be interpreted with 
caution as export data might not be published yet for all individual countries which – at a given 
level of world trade – would overestimate the share of countries for which data are available and 
thus yield a higher HHI.  Most of the product areas experience a dispersion of trade (a decline in 
the HHI) although there are a number of exceptions.  This is most clearly the case in the 
subsectors of Textiles, Iron and Steel, Machinery and Transportation.  In some sectors, however, 
consolidation already began in the 1990s, including handbags, clothing and footwear.  These are 
sectors in which China made enormous gains in world market share, pushing out competitors 
especially from Africa and Latin America, but also from smaller East and South Asian 
countries.
29 
                                                 
27 This measure was used by Mayer et al. (2002) and Milberg (2004). 
28 See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm. 
29  See Gallgher et al. (2008), Kaplinky and Morris (2008), Wood and Mayer (2009). 20 
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Source: Own calculations. Data: UN Comtrade. Retrieved from: World Integrated Trade Solution. 
 22 
 
5.2 Downturn, Recovery and GVCs: A Simple Taxonomy of GVC Consolidation 
There is not a well-developed theory of the relation between the number of suppliers in a GVC 
and the level of demand or stage of the business cycle.  The expansion of GVCs internationally 
and in terms of numbers of suppliers has been understood from the perspective of transactions 
cost considerations, following the insights of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975).  The 
approach is largely static, independent of underlying demand conditions, since the focus is on the 
ownership pattern in the vertical production structure. Moreover, the transactions cost model is 
not typically understood as symmetric, that is applying both to expansion and consolidation of 
GVCs, since transactions costs are generally viewed as falling monotonically over time as 
transportation, communication, search and policy (e.g. tariffs) costs fall.
30  
We distinguish two types of consolidation, vertical and horizontal.  Vertical consolidation is a 
reduction in the number of tiers of suppliers.  Horizontal consolidation is a reduction in the 
number of suppliers in a particular tier of the GVC. Vertical consolidation is driven by a 
shrinking of market size, reducing the rationale for the existing number of tiers of suppliers.  This 
follows Adam Smith’s notion that “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.”  
Stigler (1951) developed the insight to apply precisely to the degree of vertical integration of the 
firm. Levy (1984) formalized the process and tested it empirically for the domestic operations of 
US firms. The logic is depicted in Figure 11.  









Source: Own illustration. Based on Levy (1984, p. 382)  
                                                 
30 See Langlois (2003), for example.  Williamson (1979, p. 260) does address the issue: “As generic demand grows 
and the number of supply sources increases exchange that was once transaction-specific loses this characteristic and 
greater reliance on market-mediated governance is feasible.” 23 
 
Assume there are economies of scale and the lower curve represents the cost structure of a 
vertically integrated lead firm and the higher cost curve represents the costs of a specialized 
supplier firm.  In a small market such as Q1, the supplier firm is not cost competitive compared to 
a vertically integrated lead firm.  If the market expands and more firms enter the supplier industry 
while the lead firm maintains its production, then supplier firms’ costs, C3, are lower that lead 
firm costs C1.  As Levy (1984, p. 382) writes, “because the specialized [supplier] firm can 
produce at lower costs than the integrated [lead] firm, the integrated [lead] firm spins off the 
decreasing cost activity and buys from the specialized firm at a price lower than its average 
costs.”  The logic in reverse would predict that a shrinking market would lead to a vertical 
consolidation of the GVC, whereby the lead firm can produce at lower cost by remaining 
integrated.  Chung et al. (2008), in a related study, find that majority-owned subsidiaries of 
parent firms perform relatively better compared to arm’s length suppliers in periods of economic 
downturn.
31 
The notion of horizontal consolidation comes from Ricardo’s theory of rent, according to 
which marginal suppliers are driven out of business as the market shrinks.  This is in contrast to 
Ricardo’s theory of rent, where the issue is the finite resource (land) with diminishing marginal 
productivity. Consolidation in the number of suppliers occurs in a downturn as marginal suppliers 
are squeezed out with the decline in demand. Horizontal consolidation might be more likely in 
buyer-driven global value chains, where supplier contracts are shorter and where lead firm 
commitments to, and technology sharing with, supplier firms are less.  The process is depicted in 
Figure 12. Production costs are indicated in the figure by prices in foreign currency, where pi is 
domestic price and ei is the exchange rate for country i. Lead firms will be more likely to 
maintain suppliers with whom they have already invested in technology or capital or cooperation. 
Figure 12: Horizontal Consolidation of Global Value Chains 
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p 3/e 3 p 2/e 2
p 2/e 2 p 1/e 1
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pre-crisis post-crisis with consolidation  
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Both types of consolidation are logical in a downturn.  The central issue here is the 
reversibility of these processes.  Will a rebound in demand generate a reversal of consolidation?  
Our focus is primarily on horizontal consolidation.  Is there a rationale for asymmetry or 
hysteresis in the relation between demand and GVC structure?  The answer would seem to hinge 
on the possibility of surviving suppliers expanding capacity and capture scale economies, 
creating new entry barriers for firms that did not survive the downturn.  The duration of the 
economic downturn and speed of the recovery potentially allows surviving suppliers to expand 
productive capacity and further capture scale economies.  Such suppliers may also develop new 
                                                 
31 In related research, Chung et al. (2008) find that majority-owned subsidiaries of parent firms perform relatively 
better compared to arm’s length suppliers in periods of economic downturn.  24 
 
production capabilities. At the same time, suppliers forced to shut down during the slump face 
considerable fixed costs in re-opening operations, and thus may be at a further disadvantage even 
when demand returns to pre-downturn levels. Thus in the case of GVC consolidation, the shut- 
down of the marginal firms can lead to an asymmetric pattern when demand recovers.  The high 
productivity suppliers are in a better position to expand when the market rebounds, leading to a 
consolidation of the GVC.  
5.3 GVC Restructuring in the Crisis 
What has been the trend in the HHI over the recent downturn period?  We might expect those 
sectors or products which have seen the greatest decline in trade to exhibit the greatest degree of 
consolidation according to our HHI measure.  But there appears to be no correlation between the 
percentage decline in trade and the change in GVC structure.  This may be due to the fact that the 
2007/08 period does not capture enough of the downturn’s effect, since its major impact began in 
2008. However, if we recalculate the HHI index for a different grouping of sectors, we do find 
some regularities.  That is, while the volume of trade does not seem correlated (yet) with 
consolidation, the type of sector or GVC does seem to matter for the pattern of consolidation and 
diversification.  
The hypothesis that emerges from our brief theoretical consideration of global value chain 
consolidation is that buyer-led chains will experience the most consolidation and producer-led 
chains the least. This hypothesis gets some support when we look at consolidation in sectors 
measured by “Broad Economic Category”, which characterizes goods as consumption goods, 
capital goods and intermediate goods (see Appendix 2 for the definition).  The changes in HHI 
for these product categories between 2007 and 2008 are presented in Figure 13.  We see that an 
almost equal number of product areas experienced diversification as experienced consolidation.  
Consolidation occurs more often in consumption goods sector (categories 1, 6 and 7, for 
example) where buyer-led chains are more pervasive and diversification occurs in intermediates 
(categories 2 and 5) where producer-led chains are more often the governance norm. Finally, we 
find that there is a weak, positive relation between consolidation and export growth, as indicated 
by the upward sloping line in Figure 14.   
This result is consistent with the fact that in the downturn there have been some significant 
shifts in product market shares, with China often gaining in US import markets, while smaller 
East Asian nations have been found to be losing US market share in the US. Table 3 provides 
some evidence on how particular countries are faring in particular markets as US imports decline.  
These selected sectors reveal a pattern of China gaining market share despite the decline in US 
imports.  Other countries also gain depending on the product area.  Countries that are losing 
market share include high-cost producers (e.g. Italy in the handbag market) and low-cost, 
especially East Asian producers (e.g. Cambodia in apparel, Thailand in rubber products and 
plumbing and heating fixtures, and Malaysia in telecommunications products).  This evidence 
thus would indicate that the import decline occurring with the economic downturn is creating 
winners and losers in terms of market share.  China’s continued success in exports to the US, 
aided no doubt by the adjustable dollar peg, is taking a toll on exporters in both high-cost markets 
and low-cost markets, the latter especially among smaller East Asian countries. This finding is 
confirmed by the surveys by Hurst et al. (2009) of small and medium enterprises in East Asia, 
who report massive declines in orders and cutbacks in employment across a variety of consumer 
goods. 
  25 
 
 


























































Source: Own calculations. Data: Data: UN Comtrade. Retrieved from: World Integrated Trade Solution. 
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Source: Own illustration. Data: UN Comtrade. Retrieved from: World Integrated Trade Solution.  26 
 
Table 3: US Sectoral Import Shares by Top Ten Importers, Jan-Sep 2008 vs. 2009 
Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %-Change
China 21.3% 24.4% 3.2%
Canada 17.8% 18.4% 0.6%
Japan 13.5% 13.6% 0.1%
Mexico 7.1% 6.7% -0.4%
Korea 6.6% 6.2% -0.4%
Germany 4.9% 4.6% -0.3%
Thailand 3.5% 3.3% -0.2%
Brazil 2.7% 2.7% -0.1%
Taiwan 3.4% 2.8% -0.5%
Indonesia 1.5% 1.8% 0.3%
All other 17.8% 15.6% -2.2%
62 - RUBBER MANUFACTURES, N.E.S.
 
Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %- Change
China 33.7% 35.1% 1.4%
India 10.2% 10.6% 0.5%
Mexico 6.9% 7.4% 0.6%
Canada 7.0% 6.9% -0.2%
Pakistan 6.7% 7.6% 0.8%
Korea 3.4% 3.4% -0.1%
Turkey 2.4% 2.1% -0.3%
Taiwan 2.7% 2.3% -0.3%
Japan 2.5% 2.1% -0.4%
Israel 1.5% 1.7% 0.2%
All other 22.9% 20.9% -2.1%
65 - TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS, MADE-UP 
ARTICLES, N.E.S., AND RELATED PRODUCTS
 
 
Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %- Change
China 39.6% 40.5% 1.0%
Mexico 23.7% 24.1% 0.4%
Korea 7.9% 9.6% 1.6%
Taiwan 4.6% 4.8% 0.2%
Japan 5.6% 4.2% -1.4%
Malaysia 5.0% 4.1% -0.9%
Thailand 2.8% 2.5% -0.3%
Canada 2.8% 2.9% 0.0%
Indonesia 0.7% 0.9% 0.2%
Germany 0.9% 0.7% -0.2%
All other 6.3% 5.7% -0.6%
76 - TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOUND 
RECORDING AND REPRODUCING APPARATUS 
AND EQUIPMENT
 
Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %- Change
China 54.6% 57.4% 2.8%
Mexico 18.6% 19.0% 0.3%
Canada 8.9% 8.5% -0.3%
Germany 2.6% 2.5% -0.1%
France 1.0% 1.2% 0.2%
Taiwan 1.4% 1.0% -0.4%
India 0.9% 0.9% -0.1%
Italy 1.8% 1.3% -0.5%
Japan 0.7% 0.7% 0.0%
Thailand 1.1% 0.9% -0.2%
All other 8.4% 6.6% -1.8%
81 - PREFABRICATED BUILDINGS; SANITARY, 




Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %- Change
China 33.6% 38.2% 4.6%
Vietnam 6.6% 7.3% 0.7%
Indonesia 5.4% 5.9% 0.5%
Mexico 5.4% 5.1% -0.3%
Bangladesh 4.4% 5.1% 0.8%
India 4.2% 4.5% 0.3%
Cambodia 3.1% 2.7% -0.4%
Honduras 3.3% 3.0% -0.3%
Thailand 2.7% 2.5% -0.2%
Pakistan 2.0% 2.0% 0.0%
All other 29.3% 23.7% -5.6%
84 - ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING 
ACCESSORIES
 
Jan-Sep 2008 Jan-Sep 2009 %- Change
China 74.0% 76.3% 2.3%
Vietnam 5.9% 7.5% 1.6%
Italy 5.9% 4.3% -1.6%
Indonesia 2.0% 2.5% 0.5%
Brazil 2.7% 2.2% -0.5%
Mexico 1.2% 1.3% 0.1%
India 1.0% 0.9% -0.1%
Dominican Rep 0.6% 0.7% 0.0%
Thailand 1.3% 0.9% -0.3%
Canada n.a. 0.3% n.a.
All other 5.3% 3.1% -2.3%
85 -FOOTWEAR
 
Source: Own calculations. Data: US International Trade Commission.  
NB: Top ten importers as of September 2009 by SITC category. 27 
 
6. Conclusion: Alternative Sources of Demand and Policy Responses 
Stiglitz (2009) has noted that the recent downturn was the first economic crisis of the era of 
globalization, in that the crisis was felt globally (rather than in just some regions) and spread in 
part as the result of the globalized nature of financial markets.  But his characterization holds true 
also for the production and trade sides of the economy.  This has been the first economic crisis 
since the globalization of production (the expanded use of global value chains) has become 
extensive and sophisticated.  It occurs with highly export-dependent developing countries 
participating in the world economy largely through these global value chains. Our analysis of the 
effects of the economic crisis on export-oriented developing countries confirms that the economic 
crisis that began in the US in 2007 and quickly translated into a large drop in demand for exports 
from developing countries has had a magnified effect on trade because of the prominence of 
GVC-based trade. Trade volumes rose much more rapidly than GDP for 25 years and the reverse 
occurred in the recent recession.  The reverse effect has been more pronounced and the upturn 
more delayed in the recent downturn.  
While this magnified effect is observed across sectors, there appears to be considerable 
variation based on recent US import data.  Motor vehicles and parts imports and construction 
materials imports were falling by over 50% at an annual rate, while apparel and food imports 
have fallen by 10% or less and professional services imports continue to expand.  The effect to 
date on developing countries thus depends on their export profile, that is on their role in global 
value chains, on the nature of the value chains (buyer or producer-driven) and on the net effect of 
the forces of import demand and substitution.  
We have argued that because of structural changes occurring in this recession, there are 
reasons to be concerned about the possibility of a longer recovery of trade than previously. 
Moreover, the recession has occurred at a moment when global value chains are expansive and 
are subject to consolidation.  We have found evidence that some consolidation of global value 
chains occurred in 2008, especially in buyer-led chains. China’s expanded market share across a 
spectrum of product categories, which seems to have come at the expense of other East Asian 
countries’ exports, supports this finding. Producer-led chains appear to be continuing the longer-
term trajectory of diversification.   
  If trade volumes do not rebound symmetrically with the economic recovery, then the 
consolidation of GVCs is more likely, since the consolidation in the downturn will lead to a 
longer period of time for surviving suppliers to expand capacity and raise productivity. 
Three policy conclusions emerge from our preliminary analysis: 
(1) Declines in export demand translate immediately into declines in foreign exchange 
reserves.  In an environment where developing country foreign exchange reserves are growing 
more slowly or declining, the provision of $250 billion in trade credit by the G-20 is a useful 
stopgap measure and should be allocated quickly.  The expanded resources of the IMF should 
also be tapped quickly and with reduced conditionality. 
(2) Countries need to find other, non-export, sources of demand, or to diversify trade patterns 
to focus more on trade among developing countries. One source is expansionary fiscal policy.  
China’s large stimulus package is a prime example, and China’s growth has picked up following 
a large increase in unemployment from the initial shock to world trade.  But China’s success in 
domestic stimulus in some ways points out the difficulty of drawing any general conclusions 
about the possibilities for stimulus across the developing world.  Capacity for stimulus depends 
to a great extent on the prior accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.  China is of course 
exceptional in it reserve accumulation over the past 15 years.  Most developing countries have 
very small reserve stocks.  28 
 
The other prospect is to expand other sources of export demand.  South-South trade is often 
cited as a potential source of growth in developing countries.  This deep embedment in global 
value chains also appears in the structure of developing countries’ imports.  Figure 15 below 
shows low- and middle-income country exports to other low- and middle-income countries (i.e. 
South-South trade) by broad economic category as percentage of total exports of BEC. During 
the past two decades, the export shares to other developing countries have been continuously 
growing for capital goods, consumption goods, and intermediates. This reflects a growing 
importance of South-South trade. By definition, high-income countries have absorbed a declining 
percentage of exports from developing countries. Preliminary data for 2009 indicate a strong 
increase of South-South trade, indicating that this is a potentially promising source of demand 
growth in the future.  















































































































































































Source: Own calculations. Data: UN Comtrade. NB:  Figures are exports from Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
to other Low- and Middle-income countries by Broad Economic Category. 
Regarding the composition of South-South trade, more than a third of developing countries 
exports of intermediates went to other developing countries in 2008. The preliminary 2009 data 
even indicate a jump to almost 50%. Capital and consumption goods, however, are increasingly 
exported to developing countries as well, reaching pre-crisis shares of 30% and 20%, 
respectively. But here again, the structure of world trade according to GVCs may create an 
obstacle in the short run to South-South trade growth. Figure 15 showed that the greatest growth 
potential of developing countries’ exports over the past decade has been in intermediates. This 
indicates that South-South trade also is to some extent molded by global value chains and the 
processing of intermediates to serve these chains.  In this sense, the expansion of South-South 
trade depends still on the functioning of GVCs. 
(3) A final policy conclusion is about trade politics in industrialized countries during a time of 
severe economic downturn. Because of the extent of global value chains, developed country firms 
– generally the lead firms in the global value chains – depend on imports for their inputs and 
profitability
32 and thus these firms are less inclined to support trade protection than they were in 
                                                 
32 For some econometric-based evidence, see Milberg and Winkler (2009b). 29 
 
earlier periods of steep economic decline (e.g. the Smoot-Hawley tariff adopted by the US in 
1930 which raised US import tariff rates to 60%).  Nonetheless, there remains popular sentiment 
for protectionism in developed countries.  Resisting such a move will be very important for 
developing countries as the world economy recovers from the crisis. 
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Source: Own illustration. Data: World Bank, World Development Indicators, National Accounts (1970-2000). 
*2006 figure. 34 
 
Appendix 2: Final vs. Intermediate Goods 
The broad economic category (BEC) classification, as defined by the UN, consists of 19 basic 
categories which are assigned to the final use of the good, namely capital good, consumption 
good, and intermediate good (see Table below). Two categories (motor spirit, passenger motor 
cars, and goods not elsewhere specified) are not assigned to these categories. We would suggest 
to classify motor spirit as intermediate goods and passenger motor cars as consumption goods, 
while the assignment of goods that are not specified elsewhere cannot be done. 
Table A1: Classification of Sectors by Broad Economic Category 
Broad Economic Category Final Use
1 Food and beverages
11 Primary
111 Mainly for industry Intermediate goods
112 Mainly for household consumption Consumption goods
12 Processed
121 Mainly for industry Intermediate goods
122 Mainly for household consumption Consumption goods
2 Industrial supplies not elsewhere s
21 Primary Intermediate goods
22 Processed Intermediate goods
3 Fuels and lubricants
31 Primary Intermediate goods
32 Processed
321 Motor spirit Intermediate and consumption goods
322 Other Intermediate goods
4 Capital goods (exc. transp. equip.)
41 Capital goods (exc. transp. equip.) Capital goods
42 Parts and accessories Intermediate goods
5 Transport equipment
51 Passenger motor cars Intermediate and consumption goods
52 Other
521 Industrial Capital goods
522 Non-industrial Consumption goods
53 Parts and accessories Intermediate goods
6 Consumer goods not elsewhere spec.
61 Durable Consumption goods
62 Semi-durable Consumption goods
63 Non-durable Consumption goods
7 Goods not elsewhere specified Intermediate, consumption, and capital goods   
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Source: Own illustration. Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Accounts Product, monthly and 
quarterly imports of goods, balance of payments-based data, seasonally adjusted. 36 
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Source: Own illustration. Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Accounts Product, Monthly imports of 




Appendix 5: Income Elasticity Estimates 




tt t t MY E                                                                                                          (a) 
where M designate real import demand for imports from country j, Y real domestic income, 
and E real bilateral exchange rate between the US and country j at time t. E is defined as the 
amount of units of foreign currency per US Dollar and  t   denotes the random error term. 
Appendix 6 describes the data used in the regressions. We hypothesize   to be positive, i.e. 
higher income is related to higher import demand.   is also expected to be positive, i.e. an 
appreciation of the US Dollar is associated with a higher import demand. 
We apply an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration, which yields 
consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients regardless whether the regressors are I(1) or I(0) 
and thus  does not require pre-testing for unit root (Pesaran et al., 2001). The ARDL approach 
adds short-run dynamics to a long-run estimation equation as given in (a): 
11 1 2 1 3 1
111
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
nnn
jj j j j
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
            (b) 
The lagged level variables constitute the so-called lagged error-correction term, which should 
be retained or excluded from the equation based on the F-statistics. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide 
lower and upper critical value bounds and show that the null hypothesis of  123 0     is 
rejected if the calculated F-statistics is greater than the upper critical value bound. In such a case, 
the lagged level variables are cointegrated. 
Table A2 reports the income and price elasticities, differentiating between goods imports 
(columns 1 to 4) and services imports (columns 5 to 8). Column 1 shows the F-statistics for 
goods imports based on the optimal number of lags (column 2) which we determined using 
Akaike’s information criterion. Due to the limited number of quarters, we restricted the 
maximum lag to be six. We also tested for autocorrelation using Durbin’s alternative test (column 
3). In case the specification showed autocorrelation, we used the second best lag structure. We 
consider the error correction model with an unrestricted intercept and no trend. At the 10% 
significance level the critical value bounds for the F-statistics are 3.17 and 4.14 (Pesaran et al., 
2001). Column 1 shows that only Argentina, China, India, Korea and the UK exceed the critical 
level. Germany’s and Hong Kong’s F-statistics fall within the band, which leads to inconclusive 
results. Following Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999), the error-correction term should be 
retained in such a case. The short-run effects of income on import demand are determined by the 
coefficient estimates of the first differenced income variables (with or without the error 
correction term). We do not report these results, as they are mostly insignificant. 38 
 
Table A2: US Import Elasticities, 1999-2008 (Quarterly Data) 
  Long-run income and price elasticities of import demand 
US goods imports  US services imports 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses).  
1) We consider the error correction model with an unrestricted intercept and no trend. At the 10% significance level 
the critical value bounds for the F-statistics are 3.17 and 4.14. F-statistics are based on the optimal lag structure.  
2) The optimal lag structure is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion for specifications with no 
autocorrelation.  
3) We used Durbin's alternative test to test for serial correlation in the disturbance. This test does not require that all 
the regressors be strictly exogenous. 
Appendix 6: Data Description and Sources 
For the regressions, we used quarterly data for 16 countries for the period Q1:1999-Q4:2008. 
US imports by country of origin are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US 
International Transactions Accounts Data (Release Date: March 18, 2009). We calculated real 
imports using the US consumer price index (CPI) as deflator (2000=100). We retrieved real GDP 
data from the BEA National Economic Accounts Data in order to match the income variable. As 
real exchange rates were not available, we corrected the bilateral nominal exchange rates for 
price differences using the foreign and US CPI as price deflators, i.e.    /
US j
rn E EPP  . CPI 
was used instead of PPI, as the latter was not available for all countries. Nominal exchange rates 
and CPIs were retrieved from the IMF International Financial Statistics database except for China 
and Taiwan (from EIU Country Data).  